South Africa – What next?

Once renowned for his political instincts, despite his lack of formal education, former President Jacob Zuma’s latest political manoeuvrings have left South Africa on the brink of social collapse and heightened the country’s potential to become a failed state.

Although putting out the narrative that he is looking forward to his day in court to clear his name, there are rumours that, behind the scenes, Zuma is doing everything he can to avoid such a day. It is alleged that the apparent spontaneous public anger at Zuma’s arrest is part of a more coordinated plan to embarrass the government and weaken the hand of President Cyril Ramaphosa. The theory is that Zuma wants to demonstrate his influence and power and use that as a bargaining chip to secure a pardon. The rationale, if a pardon is not forthcoming, then he will urge his supporters to continue to cause trouble, something Ramaphosa is keen to avoid.

Evidence that the South African authorities see a larger conspiracy behind the unrest is the search for 12 known ‘instigators’ who are thought to be persons with close links to Zuma and his cronies. Indeed, the initial attacks were not just limited to retail businesses but included attacks on lorries on one of South Africa’s major commercial arteries, the N3 Toll Route, which links the economic hub of Gauteng to the port of Durban. A target that opportunistic looters would probably not consider. Protests have also disrupted deliveries of medical supplies and fuel, which could hamper the countries efforts to fight the current wave of COVID-19, which is ripping through the country

However, has the once political savvy Zuma overplayed his hand? Undoubtedly, Zuma still and for the foreseeable future will continue to have unwavering support among Zulus in his heartland of KwaZulu-Natal and the neighbouring Gauteng province. However, amongst the black population away from these areas, his popularity is less assured.

A point that has been noted of the vigilante groups that were formed to protect businesses is that they cross the traditional ethnic divides. Black, White and Asian business owners were united in defending their businesses against would-be looters. This fact has weakened Zuma’s usual ‘go-to move’ of using race issues to incite his supporters into action. The unrest is hurting business owners from all parts of South African society. The explanation of the ‘oppressed masses’ revolting against historical discrimination rings hollow when business owners come from the same communities and ethnic backgrounds as those involved in the looting.

It is also significant that the people who will feel the greatest long-term effects of shortages of food, medical supplies and fuel shortages are from the more impoverished neighbourhoods who are traditional ANC supporters. These worst impacted areas include the Zulu population of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, where Zuma traditionally draws his support. The populist root of this support seems to be a simple case of ‘he is our man’ as Zuma’s efforts while in office did little to improve the lives of the communities he claims to represent. While Zuma and his cronies are alleged to have spent their nine-year tenure (2009-2018) stealing over R500 billion ($34 billion), though some believe the figure could exceed R1 trillion, living conditions for most of South Africa’s poor plummeted.

Following apartheid and under the stewardship of Nelson Mandela, South Africa claimed to be the exception rather than the rule in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of fair and transparent governance. From its moral high ground, it influenced the politics in the region and across the globe for many years. However, from around 2010, the country began to slip from this mantel. The effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 coupled with the cronyism and patronage politics of the ANC rule under Zuma cause living conditions to worsen for most of the population, while the ruling elite acquired much of the state-related wealth. The country succumbed to nationalist, patriarchal and elite interests, which failed to address the broader societal needs.

During Zuma’s rule, unemployment across all ethnic groups and demographics grew, with around 47% of young people out of work. Furthermore, in 2008 there was approximately US$9.8 billion in foreign investments in the South African economy, which fell to around US$5.1 billion in 2019. Investors observing the widespread corruption amongst the ruling elite lost confidence that the returns on their capital were worth the associated risks of doing business with corrupt government officials.  Investors have been further put off by poorly implemented Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which have failed in their stated aim of addressing inequalities and just created another tool for officials to enrich themselves and those close to them. Indeed, BEE policies have caused the very thing they were intended to eradicate. A ‘brain drain’ of some of the most qualified and experienced staff in South Africa has occurred due to them feeling discriminated against and have caused them to seek employment overseas.

Despite the unrest, COVID pandemic and economic stagnation, recent events could have handed President Ramaphosa an opportunity to strengthen his hand and rid himself and the ANC of corrupt elements. The Zondo Commission, created to investigate corruption and state capture allegations, will be a valuable tool in increasing public confidence and transparency, which were shattered during the previous regime. Its findings, coupled with the latest antics of Zuma and Co, could also provide a convenient excuse to remove individuals linked to the Zuma administration from posts they still hold within the ANC leadership. An example of this is Ramaphosa recently restructuring the state security apparatus, disposing of the position of minister of intelligence and having the state intelligence agencies report directly to the Office of the President. However, his ability to achieve a clean break from the past is less than assured.

Whether Zuma and his allies care about the living conditions and futures of those they say they represent is questionable. The behaviour of some seems to be a case of wanting to remain in power for power’s sake, rather than use their positions to create real change to tackle present problems. Indeed, it could be that Zuma will prefer to pull the temple down on his own head and incite his supporters to further action rather than allow President Ramaphosa to remove his remaining allies from the ANC ranks. Further looting increases the chances of vigilante group justice, causing more social unrest and grievances, which could exasperate future trouble and set into effect a series of long-running score-settling incidents. If Ramaphosa fails to act and cleanse the ANC of Zuma’s influence, this continued unrest could negatively impact the reputation of the whole party.

The electorate, especially black voters, in South Africa face a choice – unwavering support for the ANC, no matter their failed promises and behaviour in office or looking to those who offer real change and opportunities to improve their lives. Those who weren’t even born under the apartheid will be the most impacted by the ANC’s mismanagement. They may not have the same rose-tinted view of the ANC history and could look elsewhere for the change they seek.

Possible outcomes

Scenario 1 (35% probability) – Ramaphosa uses the opportunity of Zuma’s trial and efforts to undermine his government to clean out and consolidate his power in the ANC to advance his social change agenda.

Scenario 2 (40% probability) – Zuma antics corrodes support amongst ANC supporters. Ramaphosa fails to break clean and prevents damage to the ANC reputation, which leads to a lack of belief in state institutions hampering efforts to bring about changes.

Scenario 3 (25% probability) – Ramaphosa government backs down, offers Zuma a pardon or plea bargain. This would severely weaken his authority both of party and country creating a leadership crisis and potential vote of no confidence.